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Summary  This  paper  argues  that  the  animalist—–someone  who  believes  we  are  no  more  than
human organisms—–should  not  be  highly  conﬁdent  that  advance  directives  are  properly  applied
to patients  who  are  cheerful  and  yet  severely  demented.  Pretend  that  I have  suffered  from
severe dementia  for  some  time.  Though  I  am  cheerful  and  well  off  considering  the  circum-
stances, I  live  with  minimal  psychological  continuity.  Currently  I  am  sitting  in  a  chair  gazing
out a  window.  Question:  is  the  individual  sitting  in  the  chair  actually  me?  My  memories,  hopes,
fears, interests,  and  ability  to  project  myself  into  the  future  are  gone.  Am  I  also  gone?  Now
let’s imagine  that  the  individual  in  the  chair  has  been  diagnosed  with  pneumonia.  I signed  an
advance directive  refusing  treatment  in  such  a  scenario.  Has  the  individual  in  the  chair  signed
an advance  directive?  The  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  what  you  think  I  am  and  what  it
takes for  such  a  thing  to  persist.  The  animalist,  who  tells  us  we  are  nothing  more  than  human
organisms, says  that  I persist  if  the  organism  persists.  I  survive  as  long  as  the  organism  survives,
and that  survival  has  nothing  to  do  with  psychology  (memories,  beliefs,  etc.),  only  with  biol-
ogy. So,  me-last-night  is  identical  to  me-this-morning  if  the  organism  is  the  same  as  it  was  last
night. This  will  be  true  if  the  organism  survived  (remained  alive)  through  the  night.  Now,  I—–as
the signee—–sign  an  advance  directive  in  the  interest  of  consenting  in  advance  in  case  there
is a  time  when  I—–as  the  patient—–cannot  speak  for  myself  in  terms  of  medical  treatment.  I
assume that  the  consent  in  this  case  is  binding  only  if  I  am  in  fact  speaking  for  myself  in  the
future and  not  someone  else.  That  is,  I  must  be  both  the  signee  and  the  patient  for  the  advance
directive  to  be  binding.  The  advocate  of  animalism  contends  that  her  view  gives  the  obvious
answer.  That  the  patient  and  signee  are  identical.  There  is  no  clinical  case  where  one  would
be remotely  tempted  to  apply  an  advance  directive  where  the  signee  and  patient  do  not  share
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a  life.  If  the  signee  and  patient  share  a  life,  then  they  are  the  same  organism,  and  according
to animalism  the  signee  has  survived  and  is  thus  identical  to  the  patient.  So,  if  animalism  is
true, then  in  the  case  of  severe  dementia  or  Alzheimer’s,  the  organism  continues  to  persist,
which means  I  continue  to  persist.  Were  this  problem  merely  theoretical,  then  perhaps  the
above argument  would  be  satisfying,  assuming  the  truth  of  animalism.  However,  in  practice,
we need  more  than  the  assumed  truth  of  animalism.  To  overcome  this  problem  of  identity,  we
need enough  justiﬁcation  in  animalism  to  warrant  a  lethal  omission  of  action  towards  a  cheerful
patient who  cannot  express  her  own  wishes.  That  is,  animalism  is  only  helpful  in  telling  you
when to  honor  an  advance  directive  in  so  much  as  you  are  conﬁdent  enough  in  its  truth  to  allow
for the  consequences  of  a  mistake.  I  assume  that  when  it  comes  to  the  risk  of  allowing  the
wrong individual  to  die,  we  should  have  a  high  level  of  conﬁdence  in  the  success  of  our  actions
before proceeding,  ceteris  paribus. I  argue  that  we  should  not  have  a  high  level  of  conﬁdence
that we  persist  according  to  animalism,  and  thus,  we  should  not  apply  lethal  advance  directives
to the  cheerfully  demented.  My  argument  is  that  animalism  is  undermined  by  its  attempts  to
overcome  objections.  For  instance,  the  animalist  must  be  able  to  principally  exclude  the  brain,
as opposed  to  the  animal,  as  what  is  the  thinker.  There  is  consensus  among  animalist  that  the
best way  to  avoid  the  brain  as  the  thinker  is  to  adopt  a  sparse  ontology  denying  the  existence
of brains,  hands,  tables,  and  chairs.  However,  the  adoption  of  such  an  ontology  reduces  the
justiﬁcatory  force  of  commonsense,  which  is  key  in  arguing  for  animalism  and  that  we  persist
as long  as  our  animal  is  biologically  alive.  This  is  also  a  loss  of  justiﬁcation  that  I am  the  signee
and the  patient,  that  the  advance  directive  applies  to  the  individual  in  the  chair,  and  that  the
directive is  sufﬁcient  to  let  that  individual  die.
© 2016  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  All  rights  reserved.
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Résumé  Cet  article  soutient  que  les  animalistes—–ceux  qui  croient  que  nous  ne  sommes  que
des animaux—–ne  devraient  pas  être  hautement  conﬁants  que  les  directives  anticipées  sont
proprement  applicables  aux  patients  qui  sont  heureux  bien  qu’atteints  de  démence  sévère.
Imaginez  que  j’aie  souffert  de  démence  sévère  depuis  un  certain  moment.  Bien  que  je  sois
heureux et  à  l’aise  vu  les  circonstances,  je  ne  vis  qu’avec  une  continuité  psychologique  min-
imale. En  ce  moment,  je  suis  assis  sur  une  chaise  à  regarder  dehors.  Question:  est-ce  que
l’individu  assis  sur  cette  chaise  est  vraiment  moi  ?  Mes  souvenirs,  espoirs,  craintes,  intérêts  et
mon habileté  à  me  projeter  dans  le  futur  ont  disparue.  Ai-je  également  disparu  ?  Imaginons  que
l’individu sur  la  chaise  ait  été  diagnostiqué  pneumonique.  J’ai  signé  une  directive  anticipée
voulant que  je  ne  rec¸oive  pas  de  traitement  dans  un  tel  scénario.  Est-ce  que  l’individu  assis
sur la  chaise  a  signé  une  directive  anticipée  ?  La  réponse  à  cette  question  dépend  de  ce  que  je
suis et  des  conditions  nécessaires  à  la  persistance.  L’animaliste,  qui  nous  assure  que  nous  ne
sommes rien  d’autre  que  des  organismes  humains,  afﬁrme  que  nous  survivons  si  notre  organisme
persiste dans  l’existence.  Je  survis  aussi  longtemps  que  mon  organisme  survit  et  ma  survivance
n’a rien  à  voir  avec  ma  psyché  (mes  souvenirs,  me  croyances,  etc.)  ;  elle  ne  dépend  que  de
ma biologie.  Par  conséquent,  « moi-hier-soir  » est  identique  à  « moi-ce-matin  » si  et  seule-
ment si  l’organisme  est  le  même  ce  matin  qu’hier.  Cela  ne  sera  vrai  que  si  l’organisme  est
resté en  vie  durant  la  nuit.  Seulement,  je—–le  signataire—–signe  une  directive  aﬁn  de  consentir
à l’avance  à  un  certain  traitement  dans  le  cas  où  je—–le  patient—–ne  pourrait  pas  parler  en
mon propre  nom  en  ce  qui  a  trait  aux  affaires  médicales.  Je  présume  que  le  consentement
dans ce  cas  n’est  contraignant  que  si  je  parle  en  mon  nom  dans  le  futur  et  non  au  nom  de
quelqu’un d’autre.  C’est-à-dire  que  je  dois  être  aussi  bien  le  signataire  que  le  patient  pour  que
la directive  anticipée  soit  contraignante.  Le  partisan  de  l’animalisme  prétend  que  sa  thèse  nous
fournit une  réponse  immédiate.  Le  patient  et  le  signataire  seraient  identiques.  Il  n’y  a  aucun
cas clinique  où  l’on  serait  tenté  d’appliquer  une  directive  anticipée  alors  que  le  signataire  et
le patient  ne  partagent  pas  la  même  vie.  Or  si  le  signataire  et  le  patient  partagent  la  même
vie, ils  constituent  un  seul  et  même  organisme  et  donc,  selon  la  thèse  animaliste,  le  signataire
aurait survécu  et  serait  identique  au  patient.  Conséquemment,  si  l’animalisme  est  vrai,  dans  le
cas où  je  suis  atteint  de  démence  sévère  ou  d’Alzheimer,  mon  organisme  continue  à  persister
dans l’existence,  ce  qui  veut  dire  que  je  survis.  Si  le  problème  n’avait  été  que  théorique  et
en supposant  que  la  thèse  animaliste  est  correcte,  il  est  possible  que  l’argument  précédent
nous eût  satisfaits.  Néanmoins,  dans  la  pratique,  nous  avons  besoin  de  plus  que  de  supposer
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que  l’animalisme  soit  vrai.  Pour  résoudre  le  problème  de  l’identité  dans  un  cas  particulier,
nous avons  besoin  d’une  justiﬁcation  assez  solide  en  l’animalisme  pour  légitimer  l’omission
des soins  nécessaires  à  maintenir  en  vie  le  patient  heureux.  Autrement  dit,  l’animalisme  n’est
utile, lorsqu’il  dicte  en  quelles  circonstances  honorer  les  directives  anticipées,  que  si  nous
sommes assez  conﬁants  dans  sa  vérité  pour  tolérer  les  conséquences  d’une  erreur.  Je  présume
que, lorsqu’il  y  a  une  possibilité  de  laisser  mourir  le  mauvais  individu,  nous  devrions,  avant  de
procéder, avoir  le  plus  haut  degré  de  conﬁance  dans  le  succès  de  notre  action,  ceteris  paribus.
Je maintiens  que  nous  n’avons  pas  de  raisons  sufﬁsantes  d’être  pleinement  conﬁants  en  la  vérité
de l’animalisme,  et  donc  nous  ne  devrions  pas  suivre  les  directives  anticipées  au  cas  du  dément
heureux.  Mon  raisonnement  est  que  l’animalisme  est  miné  par  ses  tentatives  de  répondre  à  des
objections.  Par  exemple,  l’animaliste  doit  être  en  mesure  d’exclure,  par  des  principes,  que  le
cerveau plutôt  que  l’animal  soit  le  penseur.  Il  y  a  un  consensus  au  sein  des  animalistes  que  le
meilleur moyen  d’éviter  cette  proposition  est  d’adopter  une  ontologie  parcimonieuse  qui  nie
l’existence  des  cerveaux,  des  mains,  des  tables  et  des  chaises.  En  revanche,  l’adoption  d’une
telle ontologie  réduit  la  force  justiﬁcatrice  du  sens  commun,  lequel  est  un  élément  clef  dans
les arguments  en  faveur  de  l’animalisme  et  de  la  thèse  selon  laquelle  nous  persistons  tant  et
aussi longtemps  que  l’animal  persiste  biologiquement.  L’adoption  d’une  telle  ontologie  se  fait
aussi au  détriment  de  la  force  justiﬁcatrice  de  la  thèse  que  je  suis  le  signataire  et  le  patient,  de
la thèse  que  la  directive  anticipée  s’applique  à  l’individu  dans  le  chaise  ;  enﬁn,  de  la  thèse  que
la directive  est  sufﬁsante  pour  nous  permettre  de  laisser  mourir  l’individu  atteint  de  démence.
© 2016  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous  droits  re´serve´s.
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beliefs,  desires,  temperament,  personality,  memories,  etc.
have  nothing  to  do  with  my  continued  existence.  I  go  where
the  organism  goes.  I  survive  as  long  as  the  organism  sur-Introduction
This  paper  argues  that  if  one  is  an  animalist—–a  holder  of
the  view  that  we  are  human  animals  (further  explained
below)—–then  she  should  rethink  the  applicability  of  advance
directives.  That  is,  if  one  holds  the  view  that  we  are
identical  to  human  organisms—–the  position  of,  to  name  a
few,  Peter  van  Inwagen  [1],  Eric  Olson  [2],  Trenton  Mer-
ricks  [3],  and  David  Hershenov  [4],  then  lethal  advance
directives  to  ‘‘not  treat’’  as  applied  to  the  cheerfully
severally  demented  (e.g.,  some  Alzheimer’s  patients)  are
suspect.
Here  is  the  problem.  If  the  patient  is  severely  demented,
then  the  animalist  should  lack  a  high  level  of  conﬁdence  that
the  signee  of  an  advance  directive  is  (is  identical  to)  the
patient  the  directive  might  be  applied  to  at  a  later  time.
I  assume  that  in  the  case  of  lethal  advance  directives,  we
want  to  be  highly  conﬁdent  that  we  let  the  right  patient
die.  Thus,  the  animalist  should  not  apply  lethal  advance
directives  to  the  severely  demented.
In  what  follows,  I  will  brieﬂy  explain  why  a  high-
conﬁdence  in  the  identity  of  the  patient  is  important  in
applying  lethal  advance  directives.  I  will  then  lay  out  the
main  argument  for  why  such  conﬁdence  is  not  had  on
animalism.  Section  three  will  develop  this  argument  by
demonstrating  how  responding  to  objections  should  cause
animalists  to  lose  conﬁdence  in  their  view.  This  loss  is  a
result  of  their  adopting  a  sparse  ontology  called  ‘biological
minimalism’—–the  claim  that  the  world  only  contains  ani-
mals  and  partless  fundamental  particles  sometimes  called
‘simples’  or  ‘elementary  particles’  (e.g.,  quarks).  The  ﬁnal
two  sections  will  pull  together  the  dialectic  and  explain
why,  on  animalism,  we  should  not  be  highly  conﬁdent  that
the  individual  that  signs  an  advance  directive  is  identi-
cal  to  the  severally  demented  patient  to  which  it  will  be
applied. vhe argument
retend  that  some  time  ago  I  was  diagnosed  with  severe
ementia.  A  disease  that  progressively  eliminates  the  psy-
hological  life  of  an  individual  [5].  Years  later,  there  is  an
ndividual  that  I  resemble  and  with  whom  I  might  share  a
istory  sitting  in  a chair.  The  individual  is  well  off  consid-
ring  the  circumstances,  but  lives  only  from  moment  to
oment  with  minimal  psychological  continuity.  The  individ-
al  appears  to  be  me.  But  is  it?  Did  I  survive  the  devastating
oss  of  psychological  continuity?  My  memories,  hopes,  fears,
nterests,  and  ability  to  project  myself  into  the  future  are
one.  Am  I also  gone?  More  so,  the  individual  in  the  chair  has
een  diagnosed  with  pneumonia.  Given  the  mild  nature  of
he  infection,  the  pneumonia  is  currently  treatable,  though
ill  eventually  be  fatal.  The  individual’s  cheerful  state  and
he  vast  monetary  resources  that  pay  the  medical  costs  point
o  not  allowing  him  to  die.  However,  prior  to  any  dementia,
 signed  an  advance  directive  refusing  treatment  in  the  case
f  such  a  scenario.  Did  the  individual  in  the  chair  sign  it?  The
nswer  to  this  question  depends  on  what  you  think  I am  and
hat  it  takes  for  such  a  thing  to  persist.
So,  what  does  it  take  for  me  to  persist  from  moment  to
oment,  month  to  month,  year  to  year,  etc.?  Why  am  I  the
ame  thing  now  that  I  was  when  I  went  to  sleep  last  night
nd  woke  up  this  morning?  This  is  the  persistence  question
f  personal  identity.
The  animalist  answer  to  this  question  says  that  I per-
ist  if  the  animal  I  am  persists.  I  am  nothing  more  than  a
uman  animal,  an  organism,  that  thing  that  biology  tells  us
s  alive  (in  the  biological  sense)  that  sits  in  my  chair  when-
ver  I  sit  in  my  chair.  On  this  view  the  continuation  of  myives,  and  that  survival  has  nothing  to  do  with  psychology
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r  anything  other  than  biology.  So,  I-last-night  is  identical
o  I-this-morning  if,  and  only  if,  the  organism  is  the  same
rganism  as  it  was  last  night,  which  is  true  if  the  organism
urvived  (remained  alive)  through  the  night.
Now,  I—–as the  signee—–sign an  advance  directive  in  the
nterest  of  consenting  in  advance  in  case  there  is  a  time
hen  I—–as  the  patient—–cannot  speak  for  myself  in  terms
f  medical  treatment.  Though  not  everyone  would  agree
6],  I  assume  that  the  consent  in  this  case  is  binding  only
f  I  am  in  fact  speaking  for  myself  in  the  future  and  not
omeone  else.  That  is,  I  must  be  both  the  signee  and  the
atient  for  the  advance  directive  to  be  binding.  The  signee
nd  the  patient  must  be  identical.  Imagine  that  by  some  bit
f  philosophical  magic  you,  in  a  similarly  demented  state,
nstantaneously  replaced  me  in  the  hospital  bed.  Would  my
dvance  directive  apply  to  you  just  because  you  were  my
patiotemporal  descendent?  I  think  not.  Not  any  more  than
y  advance  directive  would  apply  to  a  patient  who  became
ssociated  with  my  medical  records  due  to  a  clerical  error.
So,  what  happens  if  we  are  unsure  of  the  relationship
etween  the  signee  and  the  patient  when  an  advance  direc-
ive  is  lethal?  Say,  you  are  60%  conﬁdent  (40%  uncertain)  in
our  belief  that  the  signee  and  the  patient  are  identical.  Do
ou  let  the  cheerfully  demented  patient  die  of  pneumonia?
hat  about  a  75%  conﬁdence  that  the  individuals  are  identi-
al?  To  help,  imagine  that  Quinn  is  a  patient  under  your  care.
ou  are  100%  conﬁdent  that  Quinn-the-signee  is  identical  to
uinn-the-patient.  However,  because  of  the  mishandling  of
ome  records  you  can  only  be  75%  sure  that  Quinn  is  in  bed
47  and  not  in  bed  348. Patients  in  both  beds  are  as  similar
s  they  can  be.  Both  are  cheerfully  demented  and  will  die
f  pneumonia  if  not  treated.  However,  one  of  them  has  an
dvance  directive  to  not  treat  in  this  circumstance,  while
he  other  one  does  not.  Do  you  let  the  patient  in  bed  347
ie  while  there  is  a  25%  chance  she  is  the  wrong  patient?
I  assume  that  many  would  agree  that  such  odds  render
 lethal  advance  directive  non-applicable.  I  also  assume
hat  such  individuals  should  have  a  similar  opinion  in  the
on-identity  case.  That  is,  unwilling  to  apply  an  advance
irective  when  they  are  only  75%  conﬁdent  (25%  uncertain)
hat  the  signee  and  the  patient  are  identical.
What  percentage  of  conﬁdence  is  enough  to  risk  letting
he  wrong  patient  die?  Rather  than  answer  that  question  I
ill  refer  to  such  level  of  certainty  as  a  ‘high  level  of  conﬁ-
ence’.  We  must  have  a  high  level  of  conﬁdence  that  the
atient  is  identical  to  the  signee  of  the  advance  directive
hat  is  allowing  her  to  die.  Here  are  other  beliefs  that  I  hold
ith  a  high  level  of  certainty:  that  I  exist,  my  name,  that
 am  currently  typing  on  a  keyboard,  where  I  grew  up  as  a
hild,  etc.  Importantly,  noting  that  I  could  be  wrong  about
ome  of  these  beliefs  does  not  take  away  from  my  conﬁ-
ence  in  them,  for  I  have  little  or  no  reason  to  believe  they
re  wrong.
In  light  of  the  above,  here  is  the  main  argument:  (1)  the
pplication  of  a  lethal  advance  directive  requires  a  justiﬁ-
bly  high  level  of  conﬁdence  that  the  signee  of  an  advance
irective  is  identical  to  the  patient  to  whom  the  advance
irective  is  applied;  (2)  if  we  are  animalists  and  the  patient
s  severely  demented,  then  we  should  not  have  a  high  level  of
onﬁdence  that  the  signee  of  an  advance  directive  is  identi-
al  to  the  patient  to  whom  the  advance  directive  is  applied;
3)  therefore,  if  we  are  animalists  and  the  patient  is  severely
t
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emented,  then  a  lethal  advance  directive  should  not  be
pplied.
The  argument  is  valid  and  premise  (1)  is  being  assumed
or  the  sake  of  argument.  That  leaves  premise  (2)  in  need  of
efense  and  elucidation.  To  defend  premise  (2)  I  will  need
o  do  two  things.  First,  defend  that  animalists  should  not  be
ighly  conﬁdent  in  their  view.  Second,  I will  need  to  show
hat,  if  animalism  is  false,  then  the  animalists’  likely  alter-
ative  accounts  leave  them  less  than  highly  conﬁdent  that
he  signee  and  the  patient  are  identical.
he cost of animalism
nimalism  is  a  materialist  view  of  personal  identity  (i.e.,  no
art  of  us  is  immaterial)  in  which  we  are  merely  animals.
ach  of  us  is  identical  to  a  human  animal  (homo  sapien)  in
he  same  trivial  sense  that  anything  is  necessarily  identi-
al  to  itself.  If  this  is  correct,  then  I am  not  merely  a  brain
r  some  collection  of  thoughts.  I  am  not  something  like  an
mmaterial  soul,  which  is  intimately  related  to  my  animal,
ut  entirely  separate  from  it.  I  am  literally  a  human  organ-
sm,  a biological  object.  I  survive  as  long  as  and  only  as  long
s  my  animal  survives  because  we  are  the  same.  I  could
ntirely  lose  my  ability  to  think,  but  as  long  as  this  does
ot  entail  a biological  death,  I  have  survived.  To  be  any  sort
f  thinker  on  animalism  is  like  being  a  teenager.  It  is  just  a
hase.  It  is  marked  by  the  having  of  certain  properties  at  a
ime.  For  instance,  if  I  am  enrolled  in  school,  then  I  am  a
tudent.  Likewise,  if  I  have  mental  properties,  then  I am  a
hinker.  If  I  lose  my  mental  properties  I  cease  to  be  a  thinker
ut  I  do  not  cease  to  be  an  animal.  The  animal  is  what  I
m.  Being  a thinker  is  just  a phase.  In  fact,  if  animalism  is
rue,  then  I plausibly  started  life  as  a  non-thinker,  a  zygote,
ithout  a  brain  or  an  ability  to  maintain  mental  activity.
he  upshot  of  animalism  is  that  in  principle  I can  lose  any
roperty  not  necessary  for  biological  life  and  survive.
Eric  Olson  is  the  primary  defender  of  animalism,  and  the
hinking  Animal  Argument  below  is  his  go-to  defense  of  the
osition  [7]:
Consider  a  situation  where  you  are  alone  in  a  room  sitting
in  a  chair  and  thinking.  .  .
A1.  There  exists  a  human  animal  sitting  in  your  chair.
A2.  If  there  exists  a  human  animal  sitting  in  your  chair,
then  that  animal  is  thinking.
A3.  If  there  is  a  thinking  human  animal  sitting  in  your
chair,  then  that  human  animal  is  you.
A4.  Therefore,  you  are  a  thinking  human  animal  [8].
The  argument  is  straightforward  and  cashes  in  on  the
aterialist  conception  of  mental  properties  as  more  or  less
hysical  parts  of  my  brain.  For  most  animalists,  mental  prop-
rties  are  certain  neurological  states  that  play  the  right  role.
f  such  neurological  states  belong  to  the  animal,  then,  if  I
m  truly  alone  in  the  room,  and  there  is  an  animal  thinking
n  my  chair,  then  I  am  that  human  animal.  This  argument  is
ot  unassailable,  but  is  unchallenged  in  its  ability  to  bring
he  animalist  account  of  identity  on  par  with  other  more
istorically  accepted  accounts  [7].
Here  is  the  problem.  Objections  to  animalism  push
nimalists  to  adopt  beliefs  about  the  world  that  deny
C
s
t
o
t
c
t
t
o
h
o
t
w
t
b
m
ﬁ
i
l
o
v
a
w
t
w
p
‘
a
m
b
g
a
m
a
o
m
e
n
o
t
o
p
nAnimalism  and  advance  directives  
commonsense.  By  ‘commonsense’  I  mean  whatever  it  is
that  justiﬁes  platitudes,  propositions  that  are  so  proliﬁc  and
obvious  that  they  need  not  be  supported  by  argument.  For
example,  I need  no  argument  to  support  the  belief,  ‘‘The
sun  will  rise  tomorrow.’’  It  is  commonsense.  This  does  not
mean  it  could  not  be  false,  but  it  does  mean  that  it  can  be
accepted  without  argument.  However,  as  a  general  rule,  if
enough  beliefs  from  a  particular  source  are  found  to  be  mis-
taken,  then  we  should  no  longer  trust  that  source.  Likewise,
if  we  deny  too  many  commonsense  beliefs,  then  a  belief’s
being  commonsense  ceases  to  be  a  good  reason  to  believe  it
is  true.  Finally,  if  for  some  reason  the  term  ‘commonsense’
troubles  you,  then  replace  it  with  whatever  you  take  to  jus-
tify  platitudes  and  the  substance  of  my  argument  will  remain
unchanged.
Premise  (A1)  of  the  Thinking  Animal  Argument  is  prima
facie  justiﬁed  by  commonsense.  The  same  commonsense
that  tells  us  that  tables  and  chairs  exist.  However,  the  ani-
malist  in  defense  of  her  position  denies  the  existence  of
all  ordinary  objects  such  as,  tables,  chairs,  lampposts,  cof-
fee,  livers,  brains,  etc.  The  only  exceptions  are  animals
like  starﬁsh,  quail,  dogs,  cats,  pandas,  you,  me,  etc.  Such
a  systematic  denial  of  commonsense  belief  is  good  reason
to  strongly  doubt  other  related  beliefs.  Thus,  if  we  can  no
longer  trust  our  commonsense  about  ordinary  objects,  then
we  should  also  doubt  our  commonsense  about  the  existence
of  animals.  After  all,  animals  are  just  ordinary  objects.  In
the  words  of  Dean  Zimmerman,  ‘‘The  premise  [A1]  is  warr-
anted  by  its  platitudinous  or  commonsensical  status;  but
Olson’s  arguments  lead  him  to  conclusions  that  undermine
the  family  of  platitudes  to  which  it  belongs.’’  [9,  p.  23].
So,  why  must  animalists  deny  the  existence  of  ordinary
objects?  Well,  because  the  cost  of  acceptance  of  ordinary
objects  is  greater  than  the  cost  of  denial.  If  human  animals
have  parts  with  too  much  potential  for  thought,  then  the
thinking  animal  argument  can  be  exploited  in  such  a  way
that  it  makes  animalism  absurd.  This  exploitation  comes  in
two  forms:  (i)  the  rival-candidate  objection;  (ii)  the  problem
of  too  many  thinkers.
The  rival-candidate  objection  considers  other  options
than  the  human  animal  for  what  might  be  thinking  in
the  chair  in  Olson’s  argument.  The  objection  alters  the
thinking  animal  argument’s  conclusion  that  I  am  a  human
animal  by  replacing  ‘animal’  with  other  nouns  like  ‘brain’.
This  exploits  the  form  of  the  argument  arguing  for  rival-
candidates  as  the  thinker  instead  of  the  animal.  If  I  am  alone
in  a  room  sitting  in  a  chair  and  thinking,  then  I am  whatever
is  in  my  chair  and  thinking  [7].  For  example,
B1.  There  exists  a  brain  attached  to  an  animal  in  your
chair.
B2.  If  there  exists  a  brain  attached  to  an  animal  in  your
chair,  then  that  brain  attached  to  an  animal  is  thinking.
B3.  If  there  is  a  thinking  brain  attached  to  an  animal  in
your  chair,  then  that  brain  attached  to  an  animal  is  you.
B4.  Therefore,  you  are  a  thinking  brain  attached  to  an
animal  [8].Olson  disagrees  with  (B1)  believing  that  the  human  ani-
mal  is  what’s  thinking  in  his  chair;  the  subject  of  his
thoughts.  However,  what  if  instead  of  the  human  animal  a
brain  is  thinking  instead  and  is  the  subject  of  my  thoughts?
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ertainly,  if  I  am  anything,  then  I  am  the  subject  of  my  con-
cious  thoughts,  but  which  subject?  If  there  is  some  object
hat  is  thinking  instead  of  the  human  animal,  then  the  form
f  the  thinking  animal  argument  can  be  leveraged  to  show
hat  I am  that  object,  instead  of  the  human  animal.
Importantly,  for  the  rival-candidate  objection  to  be  suc-
essful,  one  and  only  one  candidate  must  come  out  as
hinking  instead  of  the  animal.  For  instance,  if  one  believes
hat  the  animal’s  brain  is  the  thinker,  and  the  proper  subject
f  the  argument,  then  she  must  also  deny  that  the  animal’s
ead  or  the  animal  itself  is  a  thinker.  She  must  hold  that
nly  the  brain  is  thinking.  Otherwise,  the  third  premise,  ‘‘If
here  is  a  thinking  x  sitting  in  your  chair,  then  that  x  is  you,’’
ould  be  false.  If  we  assume  that  I  am  the  thinking  brain  but
hat  the  animal  is  also  a  thinker,  then  there  would  always
e  at  least  two  thinkers  in  my  chair.  Thus,  if  a  thinker  is  in
y  chair,  then  that  thinker  may  or  may  not  be  me.
Furthermore,  if  more  than  one  candidate  can  be  identi-
ed  as  the  thinker,  then  the  problem  of  too  many  thinkers
s  invoked.  That  is,  there  would  be  more  than  one  thinker
iterally  thinking  your  thoughts.  In  this  case  any  more  than
ne  thinker  is  too  many.  However,  if  the  animal  is  thinking  in
irtue  of  its  brain,  then  how  do  we  understand  ‘in  virtue’  in
 way  that  does  not  entail  that  brain  is  also  thinking?  Or,  if
e  do  assume  that  the  brain  is  thinking,  then  is  there  a  way
o  do  this  and  deny  the  animal  thought?  If  not,  then  there
ill  be  at  least  two  thinkers,  which  is  one  too  many.  Olson
uts  this  problem  well:
Consider  your  head.  Your  head  isn’t  you:  it  is  smaller  than
you  are.  Yet,  it  has  a  brain  and  is  hooked  up  to  a  nervous
system  and  sense  organs  just  like  yours.  It  interacts  with
a  surrounding  community  of  thinkers  and  speakers,  has
an  appropriate  evolutionary  history,  and  so  on.  It  would
presumably  be  able  to  think  if  the  rest  of  you  were  cut
away.  Should  not  that  make  it  rational,  intelligent,  and
self-conscious  even  now  [10,  p.  190]?
Any  part  of  my  body  that  includes  the  brain  could  replace
‘head’’  in  the  above  quote  and  yield  the  same  result.  The
rea  from  my  hips  to  my  head  is  part  of  my  body,  so  is
y  body  minus  my  pinky.  Both  of  these  parts  include  my
rain,  and  thus  would  both  seem  to  be  ‘‘rational,  intelli-
ent,  and  self-conscious  even  now.’’  [10,  p.  190]. So,  there
re  as  many  thinkers  as  there  are  parts  of  me  that  include
y  brain;  that  is,  there  are  too  many  thinkers.
Some  have  avoided  too  many  thinkers  by  denying  that  the
nimal  or  any  part  of  the  animal  other  than  the  thinking-part
f  the  brain  is  a  thinker.  This  is  the  position  of  the  embodied
ind  account.  Jeff  McMahan  and  Derek  Parﬁt  have  hypoth-
sized  that  we  are  the  conscious  parts  of  the  brain,  those
eurological  states  that  produce  conscious  self-awareness,
r  at  least  would  be  able  to  with  the  proper  support  (e.g.,
he  organism’s  normal  life  processes  or  medical  intervention
f  some  variety)  [6,11].  We  are  not  animals,  we  are  those
arts  of  animal’s  brain  that  have  a  capacity  for  conscious-
ess.
Unfortunately,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  this  does  anything
o  avoid  the  problem  of  too  many  thinkers.  Perhaps  having  a
hinking  brain  is  not  enough  for  the  animal  to  be  a  thinker  in
ts  own  right.  And,  this  does  avoid  any  part  larger  than  the
rain  from  being  an  extra  thinker  thinking  my  thoughts.  But,
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f  this  region  of  the  brain  that  could  support  consciousness
ould  have  parts  sufﬁcient  to  be  thinkers  on  their  own,  then
he  problem  animalists  have  with  brains  is  still  present  with
maller-than-the-whole  portions  of  the  embodied  mind.
Consider  the  embodied  mind  Joan-Eunice  Smith.  She  is
omposed  of  a  complex  assortment  of  brain  tissue  with  a
apacity  for  consciousness.  Joan-Eunice  has  two  large  parts
f  her  brain  called  ‘Joan’  and  ‘Eunice’.  These  parts  together
ake  up  all  of  Joan-Eunice  Smith  and  mostly  overlap  each
ther  with  the  exception  of  a  few  cells.  As  such,  each  has
nough  potential  for  conscious  to  be  an  embodied  mind  very
uch  like  Joan-Eunice.  Question:  are  Joan  and  Eunice  both
urrently  embodied  minds?  They  each  have  the  relevant
otential  for  consciousness,  so  what  reason  do  we  have  to
elieve  that  they  are  not  each  embodied  minds  like  Joan-
unice  Smith?  Should  we  believe  that  being  parts  of  a larger
ind  overrules  what  would  otherwise  be  sufﬁcient  for  being
 thinker?  Rather  it  seems  that  these  parts  of  Joan-Eunice
mith  are  (reusing  Olson’s  quote  from  above),  ‘‘rational,
ntelligent,  and  self-conscious  even  now’’  [10,  p.  190].
David  Hershenov  has  further  developed  this  problem
or  embodied  mind  account  as  inspired  by  medical  cases
f  overlapping  cerebra  [12].  What  the  literature  calls
cephalothoracopagus’  [13].  Imagine  two  individuals  born
ttached  at  the  brain.  Together  their  brains  compose  a
arge  abnormally  shaped  collection  of  neurons  with  a  shared
ortion  in  the  middle.  This  is  analogous  to  Highway  64  and
road  Street,  which  occupy  the  same  physical  stretch  of  a
oad  for  a  time  before  they  eventually  diverged  at  the  edge
f  town.  Now,  Hershenov  asks  us  to  imagine  what  would
appen  if  a  natural  disaster  wiped  out  the  non-overlapping
ortions  of  Highway  64  and  Broad  Street.  It  seems  that,
lthough  they  now  entirely  overlap,  there  are  still  two  dis-
inct  roads.  With  this  in  mind  Hershenov  says:
Assuming  that  brains  can  be  reduced  in  size  like  roads,
then  if  roads  can  come  to  completely  overlap,  brain-size
persons  should  be  able  to  as  well.  It  would  be  arbitrary
to  insist  that  one  person  survives  and  not  the  other.  But
it  is  unappealing  to  claim  that  a  new  person  fuses  into
existence  for  this  isn’t  a  case  of  two  objects  merging
their  matter  and  forming  a  larger  entity.  Rather,  this  just
involves  someone  losing  parts  of  their  anatomy  that  we
would  uncontroversialy  deem  the  shrinking  of  a  person  in
the  absence  of  overlap.  So,  it  seems  that  even  McMahan
and  Parﬁt  would  have  to  admit  that  two  thinkers  can
come  to  have  their  thoughts  generated  by  exactly  the
same  neurology  [13,  p.  207].
If  Hershenov  is  right,  then  if  Joan-Eunice  were  to  lose
nough  cells  as  to  be  paired  down  to  just  the  Joan  part
r  just  the  Eunice  part,  then  Joan,  Eunice  and  Joan-Eunice
ould  all  three  occupy  the  same  physical  space.  To  deny
his  is  to  deny  that  I  could  survive  getting  smaller  by  losing
 handful  of  cells  in  my  brain;  presumably  even  as  an  embod-
ed  mind  I would  regularly  gain  and  lose  parts.  Like  the
ase  of  the  roads,  we  lack  a  principled  reason  to  deny  that
ll  three,  Joan-Eunice,  Joan,  and  Eunice  survived  and  now
ccupy  the  exact  same  physical  space  due  to  what  appears  to
e  a  normal  loss  of  parts.  If  I  am  an  embodied  mind  rather
han  an  animal,  I  still  might  be  sharing  my  thoughts  with
ther  thinkers.  Thus,  the  embodied  mind  account  does  not
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ffer  an  easy  solution  to  the  problem  of  too  many  thinkers.
n  fact,  any  view  that  allows  the  thinker  to  have  parts  that
re  on  their  own  sufﬁcient  for  consciousness  will  have  these
ame  problems  [13].
The  animalist  has  a solution.  One  that  has  been  adopted
y  at  least  one  embodied  mind  theorist  as  well  [14].  It  is
legant  but  costly;  it  is  to  deny  the  existence  of  brains  and
arts  of  brains—–to  deny  that  rival-candidates  exist.  This  is
 metaphysical  solution  in  which  one  adopts  an  ontology
here  undetached  parts  (brains,  parts  of  brains,  etc.)  do
ot  exist.  If  one  principally  makes  this  denial  it  is  hard  to
ot  also  deny  the  existence  of  most  everyday  objects—–thus,
f  you  are  an  animalist,  then  you  might  escape  these  objec-
ions  by  revising  your  ontology  of  objects,  but  then  you  must
ave  also  denied  that  there  are  any  everyday  objects  other
han  animals.
This  is  called  ‘biological  minimalism’.  It  afﬁrms  the  exist-
nce  of  only  animals  and  simples.  Chairs  do  not  exist;  rather
here  are  only  simple  particles  arranged  in  the  shape  of
 chair.  Adopting  this  view  aids  the  animalist  in  handling
ival-candidate  and  too  many  thinker  type  objections  by
liminating  any  part  of  me  large  enough  to  be  a  rival-
andidate  thinker.
Biological  minimalism  arises  from  reﬂections  on  the
pecial  composition  question:  under  what  circumstances
s  some  object  composed  by  other  objects  as  its  parts?
an  Inwagen’s  proposed  answer  to  that  question  is  that
ome  object  has  parts  only  and  always  when  the  parts
re  caught-up-in-the-life  of  the  object  [1].  Roughly,  to  be
aught-up-in-a-life  is  to  be  engaged  in  those  activities  that
onstitute  an  organism’s  biological  life.  Accordingly,  some-
hing  has  parts  only  if  that  thing  is  an  organism  and  the  parts
re  caught-up-in-the-life  of  the  thing.  Everything  else  must
e  entirely  simple  (i.e.,  entirely  lacking  of  parts).  Brains,
idneys,  lampshades,  books,  and  watches,  have  parts  if  they
xist,  but  are  not  organisms.  Thus,  biological  minimalism
ays  they  do  not  exist  but  are  mere  arrangements  of  sim-
les.  So,  it  goes  for  all  other  complex  non-organisms;  they
o  not  exist.  Fundamental  particles  (the  most  basic  unit  of  a
hysical  theory)  on  the  other  hand  might  be  simple.  In  which
ase  they  could  exist  and  not  be  organisms.  So,  if  biological
inimalism  is  true  then  the  world  is  ﬁlled  with  simples,  the
rganisms  whose  lives  in  which  they  might  be  caught  up,  and
othing  else.
Biological  minimalism  gets  the  animalist  what  she
ants  by  sacriﬁcing  commonsense  about  ordinary  objects.
ommonsense  about  ordinary  objects  is  what  justiﬁes
ur  belief  that  animals  exist.  Thus,  by  undermining
ommonsense  about  ordinary  objects,  our  justiﬁcation  for
he  belief  that  animals  exist  is  decreased.  If  animals  do  not
xist,  then  biological  minimalism  and  animalism  are  both
alse.  So,  as  it  stands,  if  biological  minimalism  is  true,  then
e  should  be  less  conﬁdent  in  the  truth  of  animalism,  than
hen  we  began;  and  if  biological  minimalism  is  false,  then
he  animalist  is  left  with  troubling  objections  to  her  view.
ither  way,  the  animalist  has  suffered  a  loss  of  conﬁdence.
One  might  hope  that  the  animalist  would  justify  the
xistence  of  animals  some  way  other  than  as  a  platitude.
owever,  the  literature  suggests  otherwise.  The  most  well
eveloped  defenses  of  animalism  by  van  Inwagen,  Olson,  and
erricks  all,  after  adopting  biological  minimalism,  justify
he  existence  of  animals  with  something  like  a  commonsense
l
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inference.  Van  Inwagen  argues  that  we  know  that  animals
exist  because  you  and  I  exist,  the  nature  of  thought  requires
us  to  be  composite  material  beings,  and  animals  make  the
most  sense  as  candidates  for  such  composites  [1,  p.  122].
Olson,  says  little  more  than,  composition  is  plausible,  and
if  there  is  composition,  then  animals  are  composites:  ‘‘The
particles  that  make  up  a  live  cat  are  uniﬁed  if  any  particles
are’’  [15,  p.  114—115].  Merricks,  appeals  to  the  fact  that
animals  perform  most  of  the  everyday  activities  that  we  also
perform.  When  I  get  out  of  bed,  so  does  an  animal;  when  I
wind  my  watch,  so  does  the  animal.  So,  if  we  exist,  then  we
are  probably  organisms.  We  exist;  thus,  so  do  animals  [3,
p.  114—115].
The  point  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  something  illicit  about
this  style  of  inference.  There  is  not.  Everyone  begins  with
what  they  take  to  be  plausible  assumptions;  initial  assump-
tions  should  seem  true  (even  Descartes  assumed,  ‘‘I  think’’).
Each  of  these  philosophers  recognize  that  philosophical
questions  are  rarely  settled  by  devastating  arguments  that
render  the  opponent’s  position  incoherent.  Rather,  ques-
tions  are  answered  by  considering  puzzling  cases  (e.g.,
Debtor’s  Paradox,  Ship  of  Theseus,  Body-minus,  Problem  of
the  Many,  etc.),  counting  the  cost  of  theories,  working  with
arguments,  and  ﬁnding  balance  [16].
The  point  is  that  the  justiﬁcation  for  animals  in  these
instances  is  a  product  of  commonsense  about  objects  and
composition.  This  justiﬁcation  is  no  longer  as  strong  after
denying  that  most  ordinary  objects  exist.  For  these  argu-
ments  to  work,  it  has  to  be  commonsensical  for  organisms
to  exist.  But,  after  we  adopt  an  ontology  that  tells  us  that
there  are  no  tables,  chairs,  brains,  ﬁngers,  lemonade,  or
cupcakes,  but  rather  just  particles  arranged  as  such,  our
reasons  for  believing  that  organisms  exist,  and  are  not  them-
selves  just  clouds  of  particles,  is  reduced.
What  drives  commonsense  as  an  arbiter  of  belief  is  that
there  is  a  cost  to  assuming  false  what  is  easy  to  believe,
hard  to  deny,  and  possibly  widespread.  Some  beliefs  are
innocent  until  proven  guilty.  For  instance,  my  having  hands,
that  there  is  an  external  world,  that  I  am  identical  to  the
person  I  was  20  years  ago,  etc.  are  all  commonsense.  It  is
rational  to  have  such  beliefs  until  they  are  undermined  or
defeated,  and  that  is  because  denying  them  comes  at  the
price  of  rendering  the  world  very  different  than  what  some
of  our  most  strongly  held  commonsense  beliefs  tell  us.  How-
ever,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  price  of  denying  a  strongly
held  commonsense  belief  is  acceptable  or  has  already  been
paid  through  the  reasonable  adoption  of  some  unintuitive
theory,  then  commonsense  is  no  longer  as  strong  a  source  of
justiﬁcation.
This  creates  two  issues  for  the  animalist:  (i)  if  you  have
accepted  a  sparse  ontology,  then  you  have  already  paid
the  price  of  denying  commonsense  about  ordinary  objects,
including  animals;  (ii)  the  loss  of  commonsense  as  justi-
ﬁcation  for  the  existence  of  animals  makes  it  harder  to
accept  animals  as  what  I  am  over  and  above  a  psycholog-
ical  account,  which  can  do  without  animals  or  composite
objects.
What  is  commonly  called  ‘neo-Lockeanism’  is  concerned
with  connections  between  psychological  states  (i.e.,  memo-
ries,  desires,  personality,  etc.).  You  are  your  psychology;  you
are  a  chain  of  psychological  states—–no  animals  required.  As
t
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ong  as  the  chain  is  sufﬁciently  unbroken,  then  you  continue
o  exist  [6,17].
The  ﬁrst  issue  has  already  been  explained  above.  In  sum-
ary,  the  price  of  denying  commonsense,  is  a  function  of
endering  nearly  all  beliefs  about  ordinary  objects  false;  my
ustiﬁcation  for  believing  in  chairs  and  tables  was  platitudi-
ous.  I saw  them  every  day  and  had  no  reason  to  doubt  their
xistence.  This  is  also  largely  why  I  believed  in  animals,  so
ow  I  need  more  to  justify  belief  in  their  existence.
The  second  issue  is  that  after  lowering  justiﬁcation  in  the
xistence  animals,  the  rival-candidate  objection  can  once
gain  be  raised.  A  chain  of  psychological  states  being  the
ival-candidate.  Initially  it  seemed  that  on  biological  mini-
alism,  any  candidate  for  what  I  am  other  than  the  animal
ould  be  sufﬁciently  counter  intuitive  as  to  not  be  a  true
ival-candidate.  However,  as  demonstrated  above  animals
o  longer  have  a  privileged  place  as  the  commonsense-
ustiﬁed  option  for  what  I  am,  and  thus,  the  ‘‘there  is  an
nimal’’  portion  of  premise  (A1)  of  the  Thinking  Animal
rgument  needs  more  than  platitude-status  to  be  taken  as
rue.
The  psychological  account  now  looks  more  attractive.  We
ave  already  admitted  that  we  are  struggling  to  keep  ani-
als  in  our  ontology.  To  wit,  eliminating  animals  can  be
een  as  a  feature  and  not  a  cost  of  a view.  The  fact  that
sychological-persons  could  explain  what  we  are  without
dentifying  us  with  animals  is  a problem  for  the  animalist.
After  all,  what  reason  do  we  have  that  animals,  or  any
ther  composite  thing, exists?  The  reason  given  was  that,  ‘‘I
m  a  composite  object!’’  and  something  like  the  thought,
‘If  it  were  the  case  that  animals  did  not  exist,  then  it  would
e  unclear  what  I  am.’’  Consider  Olson  and  his  remarks
bout  non-animalist  options  for  what  we  are,  ‘‘For  those
ho  enjoy  metaphysics,  these  are  all  fascinating  proposals.
hatever  their  merits,  though,  they  certainly  are  strange.
o  one  but  a  philosopher  could  have  thought  of  them.  And  it
ould  take  quite  a  bit  of  philosophy  to  get  anyone  to  believe
ne  of  them.  Compared  with  these  claims,  the  idea  that
e  are  animals  looks  downright  sensible’’  [10,  p.  200].  It
s  agreeable  that,  if  it  is  prima  facie  true  that  ‘‘I  think’’
nd  that  animals  exist,  then  the  Thinking  Animal  Argument
as  purchase.  However,  after  the  animalist  faces  objections
nd  adopts  biological  minimalism,  it  is  no  longer  prima  facie
rue  that  animals  exist.  At  this  point,  one  cannot  posit  the
xistence  of  animals  without  evidence,  and  that  I  exist  and
eem  to  be  a  composite  is  not  as  convincing  as  it  was  prior
o  taking  a  hard  look  at  biological  minimalism.
I  gather  the  animalist  must  now  ﬁrst  raise  arguments
gainst  the  psychological  criterion  before  even  assuming
he  existence  of  animals.  Prior  to  adopting  biological  min-
malism,  one  could  have  objected  to  the  suggestion  of
sychological-persons  citing  organisms  as  a  better  candidate
or  what  is  in  my  chair  and  thinking:  ‘‘It  makes  more  sense!’’
owever,  now  there  are  no  tables,  chairs,  heaps,  or  ships  of
heseus;  there  are  also  no  brains,  or  livers,  you  do  not  have
ands  and  apple  trees  do  not  have  apples.  The  qualitative
ount  on  biological  minimalism  is  minimal,  and  most  (prin-
ipally  held)  beliefs  about  everyday  objects  (that  I  have  hadables,  because  I  see  them  every  day;  they  were  hard  to
eny,  and  now  merely  seeing  ‘‘animals’’  all  around  me  does
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ot  help  me  decide  what  is  sitting  in  my  chair,  especially  if
here  are  other  (perhaps)  serviceable  options.
 loss of conﬁdence
s  I  sit  here,  I  ﬁnd  myself  believing  that  there  is  a  mug  of  cof-
ee  sitting  on  my  desk.  However,  if  I  am  an  animalist,  then  I
hould  not  believe  this.  This  is  relevant  because  it  extends  to
he  existence  of  animals  as  well.  They  are  after  all  ordinary
bjects,  with  their  existence  justiﬁed  by  commonsense,  or
hatever  it  is  that  justiﬁes  platitudes.  If  I  am  an  animalist,
hen  I  must  believe  that  animals  exist.  Thus,  if  I  have  a  low-
red  conﬁdence  in  the  existence  of  animals,  then  I  have  a
owered  conﬁdence  in  my  belief  that  animalism  is  true.
This  is  no  great  loss  to  the  animalist,  per  se.  It  hardly
akes  for  a  convincing  argument  against  the  position.  After
ll,  metaphysics  is  a  speculative  enterprise.  However,  the
onsiderations  of  the  previous  section  aim  to  highlight
xactly  the  cost  of  being  an  animalist,  and  to  what  extent  I
hould  be  conﬁdent  in  its  truth.
This  is  important  because,  in  so  much  as  I  am  not  conﬁ-
ent  in  animalism,  I  should  not  be  conﬁdent  in  those  beliefs
 justify  based  on  the  truth  of  animalism.  One  such  belief  is
hat,  I survive  as  long  as  my  organism,  the  organism  that  I
m,  survives.  This  in  turn  has  the  consequence  of  justifying
he  belief  that,  I  can  survive  a  transition  into  a  severally
emented  state  via  organismic  continuity.  Thus,  if  I  believe
hat  animalism  is  true,  then  I  have  reason  to  believe  that
he  signee  of  my  advance  directive  and  the  patient  it  would
e  applied  to  are  identical.  So,  I  contend  that  with  a  loss
f  conﬁdence  in  animalism,  I  suffer  a  loss  of  conﬁdence
n  the  signee  and  the  patient’s  being  identical,  in  cases  of
evere  dementia.  Mind  you,  it  may  very  well  be  just  a  loss  of
onﬁdence.  I might  still  believe  they  are  identical,  but  my
ertainty  is  not  what  it  was  prior  to  defending  animalism.
Let  us  take  stock  of  how  the  discussion  up  to  this  point
upports  the  second  premise  from  the  main  argument.  The
remise  states:
(2)  If  we  are  animalists  and  the  patient  is  severely
demented,  then  we  should  not  have  a  high  level  of  conﬁ-
dence  that  the  signee  of  an  advance  directive  is  identical
to  the  patient  to  whom  the  advance  directive  is  applied.
To  defend  this  claim  I  needed  to  show  two  things:  (i)  the
nimalist  should  not  be  highly  conﬁdent  in  their  view;  (ii)
f  animalism  is  false,  then  the  animalist’s  likely  alternatives
eave  her  less  than  highly  conﬁdent  that  the  signee  and  the
atient  are  identical.  I  have  argued  for  the  former  by  show-
ng  the  justiﬁcatory  cost  of  adopting  a  sparse  ontology.  The
atter  will  be  argued  below.
What  about  alternatives  to  animalism?  I  will  consider  the
wo  that  I  take  to  make  up  the  bulk  of  the  bioethics  lit-
rature:  the  psychological  account  and  the  embodied  mind
ccount  [6].  If  neither  of  these  accounts  grant  a  high  level
f  conﬁdence  in  the  identity  of  the  patient,  then  we  can
onclude  that  for  a  signiﬁcant  number  of  animalists,  by  low-
ring  conﬁdence  in  animalism,  we  raise  uncertainty  that  the
atient  is  identical  to  the  signee.
Here  is  why.  We  are  assuming  that  if  animalism  is  false,
hen  we  lose  justiﬁcation  for  the  belief  that  the  signee  and
he  patient  are  identical.  However,  if  the  likely  alternatives
l
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o  animalism  also  supply  high-conﬁdence  justiﬁcation  for
he  belief  that  the  signee  and  the  patient  are  identical,
hen  the  falsity  of  animalism  would  not  necessarily  entail
 net  loss  of  justiﬁcation.  Rather  the  justiﬁcation  from  ani-
alism  might  merely  be  exchanged  for  the  justiﬁcation  of
nother  view.  So,  if  by  reducing  conﬁdence  in  animalism  we
aise  conﬁdence  in  another  view,  then  we  have  to  check  and
ake  sure  that  we  are  not  just  replacing  the  justiﬁcation
f  animalism  with  the  justiﬁcation  of  some  other  view—–in
his  case,  that  of  the  psychological  account  or  the  embod-
ed  mind  account.  So,  what  is  needed  is  for  the  relevant
lternative  accounts  to  supply  less  than  high-conﬁdence  jus-
iﬁcation  for  the  belief  that  the  signee  and  the  patient  are
dentical,  and  thus  for  there  to  be  a  net  loss  of  justiﬁcation
n  the  case  that  such  an  account  replaces  animalism.  A  full
iscussion  of  this  issue  would  also  include  the  constitution
iew,  hylomorphism,  soul  theory,  and  all  of  those  views’  var-
ous  iterations.  I  assume  that  no  matter  how  well  argued  for
hese  positions  may  be,  the  psychological  account  and  the
mbodied  mind  account  are  popular  enough  as  to  yield  a
igniﬁcant  conclusion  without  considering  other  views.
Alright,  the  psychological  account  requires  that  for  iden-
ity  to  obtain  between  the  signee  and  the  patient  they  be
sychologically  connected  to  one  another.  Necessary  for  psy-
hological  connectedness  is  the  having  of  veridical  memories
hat  were  caused  in  a  normal  way.  If  I  continue  from  day  to
ay,  then  I  must  have  memories  that  stretch  into  the  past
onnecting  me  in  a  sense  to  my  past  selves.  These  memo-
ies  must  be  about  events  that  actually  occurred  and  cannot
ave  been  planted  by  an  evil  scientist  or  otherwise  fabri-
ated  [16].  Importantly,  the  connection  cannot  have  gaps.
f  there  is  a  gap,  say  a  time  when  an  individual  permanently
ost  all  memories  due  to  a  head  injury,  then  identity  is  not
reserved  over  the  gap.  Memories  are  among  the  psycho-
ogical  features  that  are  destroyed  as  dementia  progresses,
hich  gradually  destroys  psychological  capacities  generally.
n  the  case  of  severe  dementia  not  only  might  a  patient  not
emember  signing  an  advance  directive,  they  may  have  no
emories  from  earlier  in  the  day.  Thus,  according  to  the
sychological  account,  such  a  patient  might  not  just  be  non-
dentical  to  the  signee,  but  non-identical  to  the  individual
ho  was  sitting  in  their  chair  hours  before  [6].
The  problem  of  identity  is  also  found  on  the  embodied
ind  account.  Rather  than  relying  on  psychological  connect-
dness,  this  account  tracks  identity  by  the  continuing  of
hose  parts  of  the  brain  with  a  capacity  for  consciousness.
nitially  McMahan  seems  to  deny  any  problem  of  identity  on
is  account,  ‘‘According  to  the  embodied  mind  account  of
dentity.  . . there  are  no  cases  in  which  progressive  dementia
esults  in  a  different  individual,  much  less  a  different  per-
on.’’  However,  he  continues,  ‘‘perhaps  it  would  be  more
ccurate  to  say  that  there  is  no  new  or  different  individual.
or  what  remains  may  not  in  any  robust  sense  be  the  same
ndividual  but  merely  a fragment  of  that  individual.  . . It  is
ossible  to  see  this  process  as  the  gradual  fading  from  exist-
nce  of  the  individual  himself’’  [6,  p.  494].  McMahan  seems
o  consider  his  account  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  iden-
ity  and  advance  directives,  but  then  suggests  that  what  is
eft  of  the  individual  might  be  vague  and  come  in  degrees.
o  I  ask,  to  what  degree  must  I  exist  as  the  patient  for  the
dvance  directive  I  signed  to  still  be  binding?  If  it  is  entirely
ndeterminate  whether  I  still  exist,  then  is  an  advance
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directive  sufﬁcient  to  allow  the  patient  to  die?  Without
answering  these  questions,  we  can  conclude  that  we  should,
at  least,  not  be  highly  conﬁdent  that  the  signee  and  the
patient  are  identical,  which  is  what  is  required  for  premise
(2).
To  conclude,  when  allowing  someone  to  die,  we  should  be
highly  conﬁdent  that  we  are  letting  the  right  individual  die.
In  the  case  of  advance  directives,  that  individual  is  the  one
who  signed  the  lethal  advance  directive.  Animalists,  when
dealing  with  the  severely  demented,  should  not  be  highly
conﬁdent;  if  animalism  is  false,  then  relevant  alternative
accounts  should  render  us  less  than  highly  conﬁdent  in  the
identity  of  the  signee  and  the  patient.  It  follows  that  the
extent  to  which  we  should  not  be  highly  conﬁdent  in  ani-
malism,  is,  at  least,  the  extent  to  which  we  should  not  be
highly  conﬁdent  in  the  identity  of  the  signee  and  the  patient.
As  has  been  argued,  no  one  should  be  highly  conﬁdent  in
animalism.
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